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TO LAWYER OR NOT TO LAWYER, IS THAT THE QUESTION? 
HERBERT M. KRITZER 
William Mitchell College of Law 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the first steps in looking at access to justice is asking whether aggrieved 
persons seek redress. Starting with the legal needs studies of the 1970's (Curran 1977), 
we now have an extensive literature on the likelihood of grievants taking action (Royal 
Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury 1978; Miller and 
Sarat 1980-81; FitzGerald 1983; Harris, Maclean, Genn, Lloyd-Bostock, Fenn, Corfield, 
and Brittan 1984; Bogart and Vidmar 1990; Kritzer, Bogart, and Vidmar 1991a; Kritzer, 
Vidmar, and Bogart 1991; Hensler, Marquis, Abrahamse, Berry, Ebener, Lewis, Lind, 
MacCoun, Manning, Rogowski, and Vaiana 1991; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Genn 1999; 
Genn and Paterson 2001; Murayama 2007). The thrust of these studies is that surprising 
few people in fact do seek redress, even in the supposedly litigious United States (see 
Abel 1987).1
The obvious question is, "why"? A recurrent concern in the access to justice 
literature is that it reflects the unaffordability of legal assistance. That is, a significant part 
of the access to justice problem is access to lawyers or other forms of legal advice and 
assistance (Cappelletti and Garth 1978; Bogart, Zemans, and Bass 2005). In the United 
States, where government funded legal aid is minimal, many states have undertaken 
studies and developed policies to help meet the legal needs of low and moderate income 
                                                 
1 This seems to be particularly true in the area of medical negligence (see Baker 2005, 22-44), an area 
where Americans are regularly charged with being excessively litigious resulting in skyrocketing medical 
malpractice premiums. 
households;2 the organized legal profession in the United States has sought to address 
this issue internally through the mechanism of pro bono legal services (Rhode 2005; 
Cummings 2004). All of this assumes that a central aspect of the ability to obtain redress 
is the financial resources to pay for legal assistance (or, in the alternative, legal aid in 
some form).  
Is the assumption that the lack of financial resources is a major, or even the major, 
reason grievants fail to seek or obtain redress correct? There is some evidence that 
financial resources may have some influence. The 1993 American Bar Association study 
of the legal needs of low and moderate income households found that moderate income 
households were more likely to obtain the assistance of a lawyer to deal with their legal 
needs than were low income households (American Bar Association 1994, 27). Note that 
this study, along with many of the more recent state-based studies in the United States, 
did not include in its comparison higher income households; the implicit assumption 
seems to be that higher income households will get the legal assistance they need. The 
studies never consider the possibility that income and resources might not be the driving 
force in seeking redress and/or obtaining legal assistance. 
However, there is an early study that calls into question the assumption that income 
is a major influence on the decision to seek legal assistance. Mayhew and Reiss (1969), 
drawing on the 1967 Detroit Area Study, provide evidence that the major factor in 
decisions to seek legal assistance is the social context of the problem. That is, it is the 
type of problem not the characteristics of the person having the problem that is the major  
                                                 
2 States that have undertaken such studies include Connecticut (2003), District of Columbia (2003), Illinois 
(2005), Indiana (1992), Massachusetts (2003), Montana (2005), New Jersey (2002), North Carolina (2003), 
Oregon (2000), Tennessee (2004), Vermont (2001), Washington (2003), Wisconsin (2007). A list of the 
reports produced by each of these studies can be found in the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 1: LAWYER USE, 1967 DETROIT AREA STUDY 
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predictor of lawyer seeking.3 Figure 1 draws on results reported by Mayhew and Reiss to 
illustrate this pattern.4 Does this now 40 year-old study from a single city represent a 
general pattern or is it peculiar to time and place?. That is, to what degree can we 
generalize Mayhew and Reiss’s argument that it is the social organization of problems 
rather than the characteristics of the persons having the problem that predicts the use of 
lawyers and other responses to legal problems? 
 
                                                 
3 In addition to income, Mayhew and Reiss considered social status (blue collar versus white collar), 
education, home ownership, age, and religion. 
4 Another report based on the same 1967 Detroit Area Study found that higher income households were 
more likely to consult a lawyer for a "serious" dispute (Silberman 1985, 55, 103); however, even among the 
highest income group only about 16% saw a lawyer (compared to about 6% for the lowest income group. 
Moreover, this analysis did not specifically control for type of problem. 
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PROPENSITY TO CLAIM 
As noted above, there is now an extensive cross-national literature on the propensity 
to claim. One striking aspect of that literature is that it consistently shows that 
demographic factors, including income, have at best a very small influence on the 
likelihood that a grievant will seek redress. For example, Miller and Sarat (1980-81, 552) 
find that a model containing background variables (including income, education, and 
ethnicity) and several measures of previous legal experience reduced predictive error by 
only 2.5%. The variable that best explains decisions to seek redress is the specific nature 
of the problem; when Miller and Sarat added type of problem to their model, the 
reduction in predictive error rose to 24%. Further analyses of the Miller and Sarat data 
looking within the broad category of torts and injury found that income had no effect on 
claiming although this is not surprising given the contingency fee system in the U.S. 
(Kritzer, Bogart, and Vidmar 1991a, 523); replicating this analysis with data from a 
similar survey in Ontario, found a relationship with income but it was by no means linear 
(id., 527).5
The importance of problem type as a predictor of disputing behavior is illustrated by 
Figures 2 and 3, which show disputing behavior in the United States (Miller and Sarat 
1980-81; Kritzer, Bogart, and Vidmar 1991a; Kritzer, Vidmar, and Bogart 1991) , 
Canada (Bogart and Vidmar 1990) , Australia (FitzGerald 1983) , and Japan (Murayama 
2007). While the two figures show only broad categories of dispute types, additional 
analyses that subdivide major dispute types such as torts/injuries, consumer, and  
                                                 
5 The other major study of claiming behavior in tort and injury cases is the RAND study of compensation 
for accidental injury (see Hensler et al. 1991). While the RAND authors do not report any models of 
claiming behavior which include income, I have been told by the lead author, Deborah Hensler, that the 
researchers ran models of that type but found no effects. A reanalysis of the RAND data that reports a 
model including income shows no effect (see Dunbar and Sabry 2007, 12). 
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FIGURE 2: GRIEVANT  BEHAVIOR IN FOUR COUNTRIES 
 
 
discrimination into subtypes shows that even within dispute types, the specific subtype is 
the best single predictor of claiming and that demographic factors including income have 
at best marginal effects (Kritzer, Bogart, and Vidmar 1991b). 
While Figures 2 and 3 show that relatively few people choose to use a lawyer (with 
the possible exception of torts and injuries), it reveals nothing about whether household 
income accounts for lawyer use. I now turn to a wide variety of studies from five 
different countries to explore whether income is a significant factor in the decision to 
employ a lawyer. 
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FIGURE 3: DISPUTANT  BEHAVIOR IN FOUR COUNTRIES 
Torts/Injuries Consumer Debt/Credit 
Landlord/Tenant Property Government 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Australia Canada
Disputes Law yer Court
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Australia Canada
Disputes Law yer Court
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Canada
Disputes Law yer Court
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Australia Canada
Disputes Law yer Court
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Australia
Disputes Law yer Court
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Japan US Australia Canada
Disputes Law yer Court
 
 
DATA SOURCES 
My analysis does not employ any new data collection. Rather, I rely upon a variety 
of extant studies to examine the relationship between income and lawyer use. In this 
section I briefly describe the various studies I use, country by country. 
 
United States 
I draw on three different national studies to look at the decision to use a lawyer in 
the United States. The first of these studies is the American Bar Foundation's (ABF) 
study of legal needs conducted in 1973-74 (Curran 1977). This study surveyed 2,064 
households about a range of legal needs, both those involving disputes and those 
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involving transactional matters (property acquisition, wills, etc.).  In the discussion that 
follows, I will refer to this as the "ABF Study." 
The second U.S. study is the 1993 American Bar Association study of the legal 
needs of low and moderate income households (American Bar Association 1994) . This 
study, which focused on experience in 1992, was based on a telephone survey of 1,525 
households falling into the category of low income (up to 125 percent of the federal 
poverty level) and 1,299 households with moderate incomes (above the 125 percent low 
income threshold but below $60,000).6 As with the earlier ABF Study, this study 
included both disputes and transactional matters. I will refer to this study as the "ABA 
Study." 
The third U.S. study is the survey conducted as part of the Civil Litigation Research 
Project (CLRP) in 1980 (Miller and Sarat 1980-81). It included 5,147 households, 
approximately 1,000 each in five federal judicial districts around the U.S. (Eastern 
Pennsylvania, Eastern Wisconsin, Central California, South Carolina, and New Mexico). 
The focus in this survey was to locate disputes involving at least $1,000 (or, some 
significant intangible issue) that the respondent had been involved in during the previous 
three years; it did not include divorce issues except for problems that arose after a divorce 
had been finalized. I will refer to this study as the "CLRP Study." 
 
Australia 
The data for Australia come from a survey conducted by Jeffrey FitzGerald in 1981-
82 in Victoria state (FitzGerald 1983). This study, designed as a replication of the CLRP 
                                                 
6 Only the top income quintile was excluded from the study.  Hawaii and Alaska were not included in the 
study. The telephone survey was supplemented by a small survey of households without telephones. 
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Study, involved 1,019 households, and again focused on problems meeting a minimum 
threshold (AU$1,000). I will refer to this study as the "Australia Study." 
 
Canada 
The data for Canada come from a survey conducted by W.A. Bogart and Neil 
Vidmar (Bogart and Vidmar 1990) in Ontario in 1988. It was also designed as a 
replication of the CLRP Study, involved 3,024 households, and focused on problems 
meeting a minimum threshold (CN$1,000), during a three year window. I will refer to 
this study as the "Ontario Study." 
 
England and Wales 
The study I use for England and Wales was conducted in 2004 by the Legal 
Services Research Center (Pleasance, Balmer, and Buck 2006). 7 The design of this study 
was based on Hazel Genn's earlier "Paths to Justice" studies, one in England and Wales 
(Genn 1999) and a second done collaboratively with Alan Paterson in Scotland (Genn 
and Paterson 2001). The data for the "LSRC Study” (as I will call it) come from 5,015 
respondents households, and focus on what the study labeled "justiciable problems" 
rather than setting a threshold as in the CLRP, Australia, and Ontario studies.8
 
                                                 
7 Pascoe Pleasance, the director of the Legal Services Research Center, generously provided me with the 
tabulations which form the basis of what I report below for the LSRC Study. 
8 Genn defines a “justiciable event” as “a matter experienced by a respondent which raised legal issues, 
whether or not it was recognized by the respondent as being ‘legal’ and whether or not any action taken by 
the respondent to deal with the event involved the use of any part of the civil justice system” (Genn 1999, 
12). Events that were perceived by the respondents as trivial were excluded, with a trivial event being 
defined as one where the respondent took “no action whatsoever to deal with the problem because the 
problem had not been regarded as important enough to warrant any action” (id., 13). 
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Japan 
The study I use for Japan is an ongoing project in that country headed up by 
Masayuki Murayama (2007). This study is modeled in many ways on the CLRP study of 
25 years ago. The Disputing Behaviour Survey from which I draw was carried out in 
March 2005, and produced responses from 12,408 individuals (a response rate of almost 
50 percent). The Disputing Behavior Survey did not set any threshold level for the 
problems it asked about. A total of 2,343 respondents reported a total of 4,144 problems 
during the previous five years.9 I will refer to this study as the "Japan Study." 
 
Additional Sources 
One other source that I will employ is an unpublished analysis of the data from 
Australia Study and the CLRP Study (FitzGerald and Miller, n.d.) that carried out logistic 
regression analyses of the likelihood that disputants would employ lawyers. The logistic 
regression model included income as a variable as well as problem type and a variety of 
other variables. 
 
ANALYSIS 
My analytic strategy is to look separately at each study comparing lawyer use for 
different problem types controlling for income. The thrust of the results that I show 
below is that, after controlling for problem type, there is little in the way of a pattern of 
relationship between income and the use of a lawyer to deal with a given problem. This is 
not to say that there are no significant differences in the likelihood of using a lawyer; 
                                                 
9 A total of 12,408 respondents were interviewed; 18.9% (2,343) reported one or more problems 
(Murayama 2007, 6). 
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rather, where there are significant differences they do not show a consistently increasing 
monotonic relationship with income. 
 
The United States 
ABF Study 
 The ABF Study (Curran 1977) still stands as the most comprehensive legal needs 
study conducted nationally in the United States. Unlike the later ABA Study, the ABF 
study included all income groups. In the aggregate, the study found little difference in 
mean income between those who did and did not employ a lawyer to assist with their 
legal needs: $10,600 for those who used lawyers and $10,200 for those who did not 
(Curran 1977: 152). Of course, the aggregate may hide important differences because the 
nature of problems may vary with income, and the type of problem may affect lawyer 
use. Curran also reports mean income for lawyer users and nonusers for each of nine 
different types of problems (Figure 4.32, page 153). I reproduce those patterns in Figure 
4 (supplemented with some additional detail found in Curran’s text). The pattern shown 
does not suggest a clear pattern of higher income leading to an increased likelihood of 
employing a lawyer to assist with a legal need. 
Figure 5, which draws on results reported in Curran (pp. 154-157), shows the 
likelihood of employing a lawyer to deal with twelve different types of legal needs 
controlling for income. Income here is divided into quintiles which is useful because the  
next study I will consider omitted from its design the highest income quintile. If income 
were a driving force in the decision to employ a lawyer, one would expect the highest 
income group to stand out as more likely to employ a lawyer. Of the twelve types of legal  
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FIGURE 4: INCOME AND LAWYER USE, ABF LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1973) 
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needs shown in Figure 5, in only three (federal agency problems, municipal service 
problems, and property acquisition) is the highest quintile the most likely to employ a 
lawyer.10 It is worth noting that the lowest quintile was the most likely to employ a 
lawyer in two of the twelve types of legal needs (although in one of those the lowest 
quintile was tied with the second quintile; it is also worth noting that the lowest quintile 
was the least likely to employ a lawyer in four types of needs (although it was tied with at 
least one other quintile in two of the four).  Thus, it is difficult to discern any consistent  
                                                 
10 Using the binomial distribution, there is over a 20 percent chance that one of the five income categories 
would be the most likely to employ a lawyer in three or more of the twelve comparisons. 
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FIGURE 5: LAWYER USE, ABF LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1973) 
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pattern in the relationship between family income and the use of a lawyer in the ABF 
Study. 
 However, this does not mean that there is no pattern worth noting in Figure 5. The 
pattern that is apparent is the same one identified by Mayhew and Reiss in their analysis 
of the Detroit Area Study: the likelihood of using a lawyer is tied to the type of problem, 
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although the clarity of this pattern is clearer for some types of problems than others. For 
example, for injuries to the respondent’s child, property damage, bodily injury, consumer 
complaints, and credit problems there is relatively little variation by income, but there is 
substantial variation among the types of need. There is more variation within the types of 
government problems, although some of this reflects small samples. 
 
ABA Study 
 One study that does seem to show a pattern of lawyer use related to income is the 
ABA Study of the 1990s.  That study reports that in 21 percent of cases involving low-
income households lawyer assistance/involvement was obtained compared to 28 percent 
of moderate-income households (American Bar Association 1994, 27). Figure 6 shows 
the involvement of lawyer by income group and type of problem. For six of eight 
comparisons moderate income households were more likely to obtain legal assistance 
than were low income households. For only one type of problem (personal or economic 
injury) were low income households more likely to obtain the involvement of a lawyer; 
for one type of problem, employment-related, there was no difference between the two 
income groups. Importantly, these latter two types of problems are the kinds of problems 
where lawyers are most likely to be hired on a no-win, no-pay basis, which means that 
the resources of the client plays at best a small role in the availability of legal 
assistance.11
 However, while Figure 6 does show a relatively consistent pattern of a greater 
likelihood of lawyer involvement for moderate income households compared to low  
                                                 
11 Resources may correlate with the amount of a potential recovery, and this may impact lawyers’ decisions 
about whether to take a case on a no win, no pay basis (see Kritzer 2004, 84-86). 
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FIGURE 6: LAWYER USE, ABA LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1993) 
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income households, the figure again shows the dominant influence of type of problem on 
the use of lawyers. The largest gaps between modest and low income are for 
family/domestic problems and for will/estates/advanced directives.12 For these types of 
                                                 
12 The differences in the probability of using a lawyer are statistically significant for these two types of 
needs; the difference for housing/real property is also significant, and the difference for 
community/regional problems is significant if one assumes a directional hypothesis. 
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problems, the likelihood of a low income household using a lawyer is greater than the 
likelihood of a moderate income household using a lawyer for any of the other six 
categories of legal needs.  Thus, as with the earlier ABF Study and Detroit Area Study, 
type of problem is a greater factor in the involvement of lawyers than is household 
income. 
 
CLRP  Study 
 The CLRP (Civil Litigation Research Project) Study is the third U.S. study. It was 
undertaken not to identify “legal needs” but rather to identify households which had 
experienced a “middle-range” dispute during the previous three years. The focus was on 
disputes where the parties had a choice of whether or not to involve a court; 
consequently, divorce cases were excluded although post-divorce disputes were included. 
As noted previously, “middle range” disputes were defined to be those involving at least 
$1,000 (in then current dollars) or some significant non-monetary issue (e.g., child 
custody). The CLRP Study distinguished between “grievances” (i.e., problems that had a 
potential legal remedy) and “disputes” defined grievances for which a resolution was 
sought but where there was at least some difficulty in achieving a resolution.13 The 
distinction between grievances and disputes makes it possible to look separately at lawyer 
use for all grievance and lawyer use only when there was a dispute. 
 Figure 7 shows the pattern of lawyer use for eight types of grievances. Income 
was roughly divided by quartile. For three of the eight types of grievances shown, the  
                                                 
13 The idea was to exclude grievances where no claim was made and cases in which a claim was made and 
immediately satisfied in full.  The latter might be something such as a significant property damage 
automobile accident where the other driver’s insurance company did not dispute fault and paid in-full for 
repairs. 
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FIGURE 7: LAWYER USE BY GRIEVANTS 
CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT (1980) 
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highest income quartile was the most likely to use a lawyer; in four of the eight, the 
lowest income quartile was least likely to use a lawyer. Thus, there would appear to be at 
least some relationship with income. However, the most striking aspect of Figure 7 is that 
again the dominant factor in lawyer use appears to be type of problem. Income is at best 
operating at the margin. 
 Figure 8 shows lawyer use for those grievances that matured into disputes. The 
pattern is similar to that in Figure 7. In four types of problems, the highest income 
quartile was most likely to use a lawyer; in four types of problems the lowest quartile was  
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FIGURE 8: LAWYER USE BY DISPUTANTS 
CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT (1980) 
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least likely. Still, the figure makes clear is that type of problem dominates with income 
have only a marginal effect. 
 
Australia 
 As noted previously, the Australia Study was modeled after the CLRP Study. 
Figures 9 and 10 show lawyer use for seven different types of problems; Figure 9 is based 
on grievances and Figure 10 on disputes. Again income is broken down roughly by 
quartiles. Looking at Figure 9, one sees that for only one type of problem (discrimination) 
is the highest quartile the most likely to turn to a lawyer, and for only one is the lowest  
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FIGURE 9: LAWYER USE BY GRIEVANTS 
AUSTRALIA DISPUTES STUDY (1981-82) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
property
torts/injury
government
discrimination
consumer
neighbor
landlord
under $10,000 $10,000-$14,999 $15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999 $30,000 or more All
 
quartile the least likely (although for two other types of problems no one in the first 
income quartile and at least one other quartile used a lawyer. As Figure 10 shows, 
essentially the same pattern holds for problems that became disputes. And, most 
importantly, the dominance of dispute type in the decision to hire a lawyer is clearly 
apparent. 
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FIGURE 10: LAWYER USE BY DISPUTANTS 
AUSTRALIA DISPUTES STUDY (1981-82) 
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Canada 
 The Ontario Study, done in 1988, was also modeled on the CLRP Study’s 
household survey. Figure 11 shows the pattern of lawyer contact for all grievances 
regardless of whether or not a claim was made.14 The same basic pattern emerges here as 
in the previous studies. In four of seven categories of problems, the highest income 
quartile was the most likely to contact a lawyer, and in three of seven categories, the  
                                                 
14 Among those seeking redress, lawyers were contacted in 28.4x% of grievances (slightly more than half 
before the claim was made); of those not seeking redress from the opposing party, only 13.7% contacted a 
lawyer. 
 19
FIGURE 11: LAWYER USE BY GRIEVANTS 
ONTARIO DISPUTE STUDY (1988) 
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lowest quartile was least likely.  However, the dominant pattern is the influence of type 
of problem. The one clear exception is the category of “debt owed to” the respondent 
where the highest income quartile was much more likely to contact a lawyer. 
 
Japan 
 The Japan Study was also influenced by the design of the Civil Litigation 
Research Project study. The household survey for the Japan Study asked about a range of 
problems. It distinguished between “consulting a lawyer” and “hiring a lawyer.” Figures 
12 and 13 show the patterns respectively for these two types of actions. I have labeled the  
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FIGURE 12: CONSULTING LAWYERS 
JAPAN DISPUTING BEHAVIOUR STUDY (2005) 
 
 
 
income categories as “low”, “low-middle”, “high-middle”, and “high” because the 
categories used in the survey do not combine to form approximate quartiles.15
 Essentially the same type of pattern emerges yet again. There is a tendency of the 
highest income group to be the most likely to consult or hire a lawyer, and perhaps a 
pattern of the lowest income group being the least likely. However, the income pattern is 
clearly overwhelmed by the pattern defined by problem type. Family/relative problems 
are most likely to involve lawyers more or less regardless of income, followed by  
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15 The categories were defined as under ¥4,000,000 (low), ¥4,000,000 to ¥5,999,999 (low-middle), 
¥6,000,000 to ¥8,999,999 (high-middle), ¥9,000,000 or more (high). 
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FIGURE 13: HIRING LAWYERS 
JAPAN DISPUTING BEHAVIOUR STUDY (2005) 
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money/credit problems. In contrast, accidents, goods/services, and employmen
are unlikely to involve lawyers regardless of income. 
 
England and Wales 
 Given that the LSRC Study in England and Wales was modeled Hazel Genn’s 
work on Paths to Justice, it falls somewhere between the legal needs studies and th
on “justiciable problems” rather than on “grievances,” “disputes,” or “legal needs.”
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Figure 14 shows the likelihood of consulting a solicitor for seven types of justiciable 
problems; income is broken into three categories: low,
£
 As the figure 
there is substantial variation by income; however for both of these categories, it is the l
income group that is most likely to consult a solicitor. There is variation in some of th
other types of problems, but for those less than 20 percent of any group consulted a 
solicitor. There are three types of problems for which the high income group was mo
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likely to consult a solicitor, but for all three, the high income group was only a couple of 
percentage points more likely to have seen a solicitor than was the middle income group. 
Most important, as with the other studies, it is the type of problem that seems to be the 
stronger factor in accounting for contacting a solicitor. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 The patterns described above are sufficiently consistent that relatively little would 
be added by undertaking multivariate analyses with additional control variables. 
Nonetheless, it is worth considering one such analysis that was done using the data from 
the CLRP Study and the Australia Study. This analysis appears in an unpublished paper 
by Jeffrey FitzGerald and Richard E. Miller (n.d.).  The analysis predicted lawyer use by 
disputants including problem type, family income, characteristics of the head of the 
household (education, age, occupation, gender, and ethnicity), legal resources and 
experience (personal contacts with a lawyer or legal official, prior lawyer use, and 
previous experience as a plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit), whether the other side 
employed a lawyer, with the disputant had resorted to a third party, whether the claim is 
monetary or nonmonetary and if monetary, the amount at stake, whether the opposing 
party is an individual or an organization, and whether the respondent knew or had prior 
contact with the opposing party. FitzGerald and Miller reported the results of their 
analysis in the form of predicted probabilities, where those probabilities were obtained by 
varying the value of one variable while the other variables were held at their mean 
values.16
                                                 
16 The n’s for the two logistic regressions are 821 and 334 for the U.S. and Australia respectively; the 
respective reductions in predictive error are 22.5% and 39.0%. 
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wyers dependent on the disputant’s family income. In fact, family income does not 
ave any statistically significant effect on the use of lawyers in this analysis. 
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 Figure 15 shows how the estimated percentages vary depending on type of 
problem, amount at stake (for monetary claims), and family income.17 The figure shows 
strong effects for stakes and for type of problem. It shows no pattern of increasing use of 
la
h
 
DISCUSSION 
 The patterns presented above are remark
li pact on grievants’ or disputants’ decisions to seek the assistance or advice of a 
lawyer. While income may play some role in such decisions, that role is very small 
compared to the type (and size) of the matter at issue. The small role of income seems in
many ways counterintuitive. Except for matters handled on a no-win, no-pay basis, o
                                                 
17 The actual predicted percentage of Australians using lawyers for post-divorce matters was approximately 
100%; to avoid distorting the graphs, I limited the maximum percentage for all three graphs to 60%. 
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persons and matters qualifying for legal assistance, the cost of legal assistance is likely to 
be significant, and it seems logical that a person’s resources would play a major role in 
the decision to get that assistance. Why do people choose not to get legal assistance, eve
when they can afford to do so? 
n 
The ABA Study did ask the respondents, all of whom resided in low or moderate 
y they did not seek help from the legal/judicial system, which 
ns. 
at 
ns are 
a tax 
case 
ad 
 
come 
s to 
 
income households, wh
included seeking the assistance from a lawyer. Only 16 percent of low income 
respondents and only 8 percent of moderate income respondents cited cost concer
Many more, 30 percent of low income respondents and 33 percent of moderate income 
respondents, thought that it would not help or that the issue was “not really a problem” 
(American Bar Association 1994, 26). 
 Reflected in the response pattern above is a kind of cost-benefit calculation th
turns on an assessment of the likely benefit a lawyer would provide. Such calculatio
not limited to low and moderate income households. This was clearly illustrated in 
appeal case I observed during an earlier research project (Kritzer 1998, 87-88). The 
involved a pilot for a major airline who was appealing a decision of the Wisconsin 
Department of Revenue to disallow a deduction related to a speculative gold mine he h
invested in. The hearing was a very confused affair because of the taxpayer’s decision to
appear without legal counsel. Clearly, this was someone who was in the top 10% in
bracket and who could have afforded to hire a lawyer but made a decision not to. In fact, 
before the hearing started, the taxpayer commented to the tax commissioner who wa
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hear the ap torney 
costs in the matter would probably exceed the amount the department claims I owe.”18
 Even if people with adequate resources are making cost-benefit calculations that 
lead them not to hire a lawyer to assist with a legal need, that reflects a choice they are in 
a position to make. A person with limited means does not have that luxury. However, 
does that prevent a person of limited means from hiring a lawyer if the person believes 
that a lawyer would provide a significant benefit? The answer to this question may be 
less apparent than many would assume. 
 A study in Denver, Colorado compared the sentence outcomes obtained in felony 
inal cases by public defenders and by privately retained defense counsel for cases 
convicted (for example, your crime was captured on videotape), it is not 
unreasonable to imagine that you will be less inclined to scrape together 
the money for private counsel than if, for example, you know you are 
wrongly accused.  
0). In 
peal that he had not brought an attorney because, “I believe that the at
crim
filed during calendar year 2002. The study found that clients of public defenders 
experienced worse outcomes than did the clients of privately retained counsel, even after 
controlling for nature of the offense. The authors speculate that this may reflect decisions 
of “marginally-indigent” defendants rather than the effectiveness of the lawyer: 
If you are a marginally-indigent defendant, and you know not only that 
you are guilty but that there is a very high probability that you will be 
The authors suggest that the difference between the outcomes achieved by public 
defenders and privately retained lawyers may result from the clients of the public 
defenders having, on average, worse cases (Hoffman, Rubin, and Shepherd 2005, 23
                                                 
procedure. Normally the tax commissioner would not rule orally on cases that are not small claims, but he 
18 The amount at issue was $9,000 plus interest, which put it beyond the Tax Commission’s “small claim” 
offered to do so in this case if the two parties consented; the parties did consent, and the commissioner 
ruled against the taxpayer. The taxpayer’s presentation of his case was extremely confusing; it is possible 
that an experienced tax attorney could have presented the case in a way that would have been successful, 
but that is pure speculation on my part. 
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fact, the authors’ analysis shows that 41 percent of defendants facing serious charges 
(“class one” or “class two” felonies) managed to retain private counsel compared to 28 
percent for all felony defendants  (id., p. 239-240, percentages computed by the author); 
there is no reason to assume that those facing serious charges had greater financial means 
a lawyer, 
e 
 
he 
decisions about hiring legal counsel when they confront legal problems. If the likelihood 
that such households would hire a lawyer differ little from what low and moderate 
than those facing lesser charges. 
 My analysis has not focused on criminal cases. However, the study described 
above suggests that when thinking about decisions of individuals to pay to hire 
one must consider those individuals’ assessment of the seriousness of the issue and th
likely benefit that a lawyer might produce. There may be many justiciable problems 
where a rational actor will come to the conclusion that the potential benefit is not worth 
the cost of legal counsel. 
 From the viewpoint of understanding issues related to access to justice, this takes
us to the question of what baseline should be used in assessing “unmet legal needs.” The 
standard approach has been to determine what legal problems low and moderate income 
households have experienced, and then to label that proportion where legal assistance 
was not obtained as “unmet legal needs.” Researchers and policymakers fail to ask t
question of whether someone with adequate financial resources would choose to expend 
those resources to hire a lawyer to assist with the legal problems that are identified. In 
fact, recent studies in the United States have tended to exclude from the study households 
in some higher income bracket (often the top quintile). By excluding higher income 
households, one cannot determine whether those households make similar or different 
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income households do in similar situations, it raises the question of whether the absence 
of such assistant truly represents an “unmet legal need” that should be addressed through 
me fo  
ful 
ss 
ices? 
Report Provided by the Center for Survey Research & Analysis at the University 
District  A Report 
Illinois  
Indiana: Legal Needs Study of the Poor in Indiana (February 1992) 
Report available at 
so rm of legal aid or pro bono program. Whether the consumer’s decision is rational
or irrational, is something that might need to be addressed.  In the end, we may need to 
ask the difficult questions of whether employing a lawyer would have made a meaning
difference in dealing with the legal problem or legal need, and even if a lawyer would 
have made a difference, whether that difference is sufficient to justify the cost, regardle
of who bears the cost, of those legal serv
 
 
APPENDIX 
State-Level Studies of Legal Needs in the United States 
Connecticut: Civil Legal Needs Among Low-Income Households in Connecticut, A 
of Connecticut (April 2003). 
 of Columbia: Civil Legal Services Delivery in the District of Columbia,
by the District of Columbia Bar Foundation (September 2003). 
: The Legal Aid Safety Net: A Report on the Legal Needs of Low-Income
Illinoisans (February 2005). 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Legal Needs Survey: Findings from a Survey of Legal 
Needs of Low-Income Households in Massachusetts (May 2003). 
Montana: Legal Needs of Low Income Households in Montana: Final Report. By D. 
Michael Dale, A Study Conducted by the Montana State Bar Association (2005). 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1149970443.85/MT%20LNS%20Full_Re
port.pdf [last visited June 5, 2007]. 
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New Jersey: Legal Problems, Legal Needs: The Legal Assistance Gap Facing Lower 
Legal Services of New Jersey (2002) 
North Carolina: North Carolina Legal Needs Assessment. North Carolina Legal Services 
Oregon: The State of Access to Justice in Oregon; Part I: Assessment of Legal Needs, by 
D. Michael Dale (March 2
Income People in New Jersey. A Report from the Poverty Research Institute of 
Planning Council (2003). 
001). 
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ustice Gap: Wisconsin’s Unmet Legal Needs. Final Report, 
Access to Justice Committee, State Bar of Wisconsin (March 2007), available at 
Tennessee: Report from the Statewide Comprehensive Legal Needs Survey for 2003. 
Prepared for the Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services by Barbara Barton, 
Bingham Pope, and Karen Homer, Office of Research and Public Service, College
of Social Work, University of Tennessee (January 2004). 
Vermont: Report on Investigation of Need and Assessment. Committee on Equal Acces
to Legal Services (September 2001). 
Washington: The Washington State Civil Legal Needs Study. Task Force on Civil Equal 
Justice Funding, Washington State Supreme Court (September 2003). 
Wisconsin: Bridging the J
http://www.wisbar.org/am/template.cfm?section=bridging_the_justice_gap [last 
Journal 443-467. 
American Bar Association (1994) “Findings of the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study.” 
Press. 
Bogart, W. A. and Neil Vidmar (1990) “Problems and Experiences with the Ontario 
Bridges and Barriers. Toronto: Carswell. 
Bogart, W.A., Frederick Zemans, and Julia Bass [eds.] (2005) Access to Justice for the 
visited June 5, 2007]. 
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